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COMMENTS]
ERISA Qualified Subrogation Liens:
Should They be Reduced to Reflect a
Pro Rata Share of Attorney Fees?
I. Introduction
The last two years of litigation in the field of ERISA' qualified
health care plan subrogation liens have been very confusing for
plaintiffs' lawyers The federal courts have hosted battles between
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (1994).
2. In the context of self-funded health care plans, "subrogation" is defined as
the plan's right to be put in the position of the beneficiary, in order to recover from
third parties who are legally responsible for a loss paid by the insurer. See 16
COUCH ON INSURANCE 2d § 61:1 at 75 (rev. ed. 1983). Subrogation is a method
used to hold down the costs of health care for a benefit plan by preventing an
undeserved windfall to the beneficiary. See Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health
Care, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 143, 152 (D. Mass. 1998) (citing Frost v. Porter Leasing
Corp., 436 N.E.2d 387, 392 (Mass. 1982) (Wilkins, C.J. concurring)).
3. Compare Waller v. Hormel Food Corp., 120 F.3d 138, 142 (8th Cir. 1997)
(reducing a plan's subrogation lien by the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee),
and Serembus v. Mathwig, 817 F. Supp. 1414, 1423 (E.D.Wis. 1992) (reducing the
plan's subrogation lien by one-third to cover attorney fees), with Ryan by Capria-
Ryan v. Federal Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d. Cir. 1996) (refusing to
subtract a pro rata share of reasonable attorney fees from the plan's subrogation
lien), and Walker v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 159 F.3d 938, 940 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating
that an interpretation of the plan's provisions to provide for attorneys' fees and
expenses would be wholly improper).
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plan beneficiaries and health care plan providers over whether
subrogation liens on settlements and judgements from third parties5
should be reduced to reflect a pro rata share of attorneys' fees.
ERISA is silent on the issue of subrogation liens, but most ERISA
plans provide for subrogation and state that the health care plan
(hereinafter the plan) is entitled to be reimbursed for 100% of any
expenditures made on behalf of the plaintiff, without any reduction
for attorneys' fees and costs.
6
A typical situation giving rise to the issue at hand starts with a
self-funded7 ERISA qualified health care plan. An employee, or a
family member covered by the plan, is injured by a third party.
After the beneficiary/employee signs a subrogation agreement, the
plan pays for the injured person's medical bills. For example, a
typical subrogation agreement may read:
If you (the beneficiary) or your covered dependent has a claim
for damages from a third party or parties for any illness or injury
for which benefits are payable under this plan, we (the plan) are
subrogated to such claim or right of recovery. Our right of
subrogation will be to the extent of any benefits paid or payable
8under this plan, and shall include any compromise promise ....
In other words, if the injured person files an action against an
allegedly negligent third party and collects a settlement or
4. Within the context of this Comment, beneficiaries of self-funded health
care plans are primarily participants in that plan by virtue of their employment and
are paid health care benefits from the plan, such as medical expenses, when the
need arises. See Waller, 120 F.3d at 139.
5. The "third parties" discussed in this comment are primarily negligent tort-
feasors and their insurance companies. See Silcott v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc.
Health and Welfare Plan, No. CIV. A. 97-7044, 1998 WL 422032, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
July 24, 1998) (resolving dispute over settlement agreement between plaintiff and
Athens II Motel as a result of injuries sustained when plaintiff fell down a motel
stairwell); Ryan, 78 F.3d. at 125 (resolving dispute over plaintiff's settled
malpractice claim); Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., 115 F.3d 493, 493 (7th Cir.
1997) (resolving dispute over plaintiff's settlement with negligent car driver who
caused plaintiff injury in a car accident).
6. See G. Patrick Murphy, A Plaintiff Lawyer's Guide to Settlement Offers
and Liens, 86 ILL. B.J. 91, 91 (1998).
7. This comment deals with self-funded ERISA plans and the federal
common law applied to them, as opposed to insurance-funded ERISA plans.
Insurance-funded ERISA plans are governed by state laws that are not preempted
due to ERISA's 'savings clause.' See generally Metro. Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 743 (1985). ERISA plans that are self funded by
employee/employer contributions are not saved from preemption even if they fall
within state law definitions regulating insurance. See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498
U.S. 52, 61 (1990).
8. United McGill Corp. v. Stinnett, 154 F.3d 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting the
subrogation language at issue in the plan).
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judgement, the plan is reimbursed for the amount of money it paid
for the injured person's medical bills. At issue is whether the plan
should have to pay a pro rata share of attorney fees because the
plan's reimbursement depends on the efforts of the plaintiff's
attorney in the action against the third party.
Despite a strong trend to find that plans are not required to
pay a pro rata share of attorneys' fees in cases where the contract
language dealing with subrogation liens is unambiguous,9 courts are
troubled by the potentially unfair result of having plan beneficiaries
pay for attorneys whose efforts benefit both the beneficiary and the
health care plan.' °  Courts interpreting ambiguous contract
language concerning subrogation liens are quick to find for the plan
beneficiaries and reduce subrogation liens to compensate
attorneys.1' Courts recognize the possibility that ruling otherwise
could "hinder the settlement of claims by plan beneficiaries against
third parties.
1 2
The federal courts should create and adopt a uniform federal
common law requiring, even in plans containing unambiguous
language, a reduction in subrogation liens covering attorneys' fees.'3
9. See Ryan, 78 F.3d at 127 (holding that the plan subrogation language
unambiguously required full reimbursement to the plan). See also Bollman Hat
Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 117 (3d Cir. 1997).
10. See Silcott, 1998 WL 422032, at *6 (recognizing that the resulting holding
seems unfair because no reimbursement would have been received by the
defendant plan were it not for the efforts of the plaintiff's attorney); IBP, Inc., v.
Foust, 987 F. Supp. 714, 722 (N.D.Iowa 1997) (noting that the court would not
hesitate to use either the doctrine of unjust enrichment or the federal common
fund doctrine to require the defendant to bear its fair share of the plaintiff's
attorneys' fees were it not for binding authority that would not permit such a
result).
11. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates Health and Welfare Plan v. Bond,
No. CIV. A. 96-7522, 1997 WL 255527, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997) (finding the
plan's subrogation language to be ambiguous and reducing the subrogation lien to
reflect the plan's pro-rata share of attorneys' fees).
12. Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1997). The Bollman
court makes reference to the plaintiff's Amicus brief's hypothetical fact pattern
where medical costs advanced by the plan, to a beneficiary, exceed a jury verdict in
a case of disputed liability. See Amicus Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Bollman Hat
Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1997) (No. 96-1191). Amicus noted that "the
plaintiff can find himself in the unfortunate position of assigning the entire verdict
to his welfare fund (plan) and forwarding a personal check for fees and costs to his
lawyer." Id. at 11. Consequently, the initiative to pursue third parties could be
foolish. See id.
13. See Waller v. Hormel Food Corp, 120 F.3d 138, 141 (8th Cir. 1997)
(reducing the subrogation lien by the amount of a reasonable attorneys' fee). See
also Serembus v. Mathwig, 817 F. Supp. 1414, 1417 (E.D. Wis. 1992) (stating that
because the plan benefit's from the beneficiary's pursuit of her claims, a one-third
reduction of the plan's subrogation amount fairly apportions the attorney's fees);
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This common law would ensure that plaintiffs are adequately
represented and compensated in tort claims against third parties,
that attorneys are paid for their services, and that health care plans
pay their share of attorneys' fees for services directly benefitting
them.
II. Background Information on ERISA
A. Purpose of ERISA
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act was enacted in
1974 to uniformly govern employee benefit plans and "to
protect... the interests of participants ... and their
beneficiaries.., by establishing standards of conduct,
responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries.., and by providing
for appropriate remedies [and] sanctions."14
Although commonly known for its regulation of employee
pension plans,15 ERISA also regulates employee welfare benefit
plans. 6 While pension plans are subject to substantive regulation
under ERISA, welfare regulation is essentially administrative.
17
Employers generally have free reign to design and fund welfare
plans under ERISA.'8 "ERISA's concern is with the administration
of [welfare] benefit plans and not with the precise design of the
plan."' 9 The purpose of ERISA is to ensure the proper execution of
plans once designed, not to impose a duty on employers to provide
healthcare benefits to their employees.
McIntosh v. Pacific Holding Co., 120 F.3d 911, 912 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that the
plaintiff has an action for attorney fees equal to the value of the claimant's legal
services to the plan).
14. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)(1994).
15. Pension plans provide for an employee's financial security upon
retirement. See Shawn C. Moore, Note, ERISA Preemption of State Subrogation
Laws: Baxter v. Lynn and FMC Corp v. Holliday, 43 ARK. L. REv. 477, 482 (1990).
16. A welfare benefit plan is defined as "any plan, fund or program through
which an employer provides employees, through the purchase of insurance or
otherwise, with medical, surgical or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the
event of sickness, accident, disability, death or unemployment." 29 U.S.C. §
1002(1).
17. See Robert C. Macaulay, ERISA Preemption: A Road Map for Weary
Travelers, 37 BOSTON B.J. 5, 25 (1993).
18. See id.
19. Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1329 (citing Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners,
Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1159 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Hlinka v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 863 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1988); Viggiano v. Shenango China Div. of
Anchor Hocking Corp., 750 F.2d 276, 279 (3d Cir. 1984).
20. See Nazay, 949 F.2d at 1329.
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B. Preemption of State Law by ERISA
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides for the preemption of "any
and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan., 21 This preemption provision was intended
by Congress "to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be
subject to a uniform body of benefit law; the goal was to minimize
the administrative and financial burden of complying with
conflicting directives among states or between states and the
Federal Government.,
22
In Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, the court construed section 514 (a)
broadly.2 In Shaw, the United States Supreme Court was faced
with the issue of whether ERISA preempted a New York law that
required employers to pay sick leave to employees who missed
work due to pregnancy. In finding that the New York law was
preempted by ERISA, the court held that a law "relates to an
employee benefit plan in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such plans."25  The Court went
further to find that if a state law "related to" an employee benefit
plan, even where the state law regulated a subject matter not
explicitly covered by ERISA, the state law would be preempted.26
ERISA's preemption provision is limited by section 514
(b)(2)(A), which is commonly referred to as 'the "savings clause. 27
Section 514 (b)(2)(A) states that "nothing in this title shall be
construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any state
which regulates insurance, banking or securities."' The purpose of
this section is to preserve the traditional role of the states in
21. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
22. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 133 (1990) (holding that
ERISA preempted the employee's state law wrongful discharge claim based on an
allegation that his discharge was due to his employer's desire to avoid making
contributions to the employee's pension fund).
23. 463 U.S. 85, 85 (1983).
24. See id. at 85.
25. Id. at 96-97.
26. See id. at 98. In coming to this conclusion, the Court looked to the
legislative history of ERISA's preemption provision. See id. The Court noted that
the original bill that became ERISA contained a preemption clause limited to state
laws relating to specific subjects covered by ERISA. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98. The
Conference Committee rejected the original language in favor of the provision's
present language, indicating that the preemptive scope of section 514(a) was as
broad as its language. See id. at 98 (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1090, p. 383
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639).
27. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1994).
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
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regulating insurance in accordance with such legislation as the
McCarran-Ferguson Act.29
The Supreme Court first considered the "savings clause" in
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts.° Massachusetts law required
health care policies to provide a minimum of 60 days of coverage
for confinement in a mental hospital.31 The Attorney General of
Massachusetts alleged that Metropolitan Life had sold insured
employee benefit plans that failed to meet the minimum mental
health coverage requirements.32 Metropolitan Life claimed that
ERISA preempted the Massachusetts law because it restricted the
types of insurance policies that welfare benefit plans could buy.3
The Court found that the Massachusetts law had a major impact on
insured benefit plans and, consequently, "related to" ERISA-
governed plans.34 In applying a common sense application of the
savings clause,35  however, the Court concluded that the
Massachusetts law was saved from preemption by ERISA because
the law regulated insurance.36
In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v Dedeaux, the Supreme Court dealt with
the issue of whether common law bad faith tort claims against an
insurance company, based on alleged improper processing of a
claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan, were preempted
by ERISA 7 In holding that the plaintiff's common law tort claim
was preempted by ERISA, the Court reasoned that the state's
common law relating to bad faith claims did not "regulate
insurance" for purposes of the savings clause because the common
law doctrine was not directed at the insurance industry." The court
stated that "[a] common sense view of the word 'regulates' would
lead to the conclusion that in order to regulate insurance, a law
must not just have an impact on the insurance industry, but must be
specifically directed toward that industry."'3 9
In addition to the "savings clause," ERISA contains what is
known as the "deemer clause" in section 514(b)(2)(B). The
"deemer clause" states that "[n]either an employee benefit plan ...
29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994).
30. 471 U.S. 724, 724 (1985).
31. See id. at 730.
32. See id. at 732.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 739.
35. See Metro Life, 471 U.S. at 740.
36. See id at 744.
37. 481 U.S. 41, 46 (1987).
38. See id at 50.
39. Id.
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nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be
an insurance company or other insurer.., to be engaged in the
business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any state
purporting to regulate insurance companies. 4 0 The purpose of this
clause is to prevent states from labeling regulation of employee
benefits as "regulation of insurance" in order to enjoy the
protection of the savings clause .
In FMC Corp. v. Holliday, Cynthia Holliday was injured in an
automobile accident and was eligible for health insurance benefits
under her father's welfare benefit plan provided by the FMC.
2
Before reimbursing him for his daughter's medical expenses, the
FMC required Mr. Holliday to sign a form, acknowledging a
subrogation provision in case of any action against a third party. 3
The Hollidays brought suit against an allegedly negligent third
party and the FMC announced its intention to exercise its
subrogation rights against any recovery received." The Hollidays
responded by contending that Pennsylvania law prohibited
subrogation. In holding that ERISA preempted Pennsylvania's
anti-subrogation statute, the Court opined that "state laws directed
toward self-funded ERISA plans are preempted because they
'relate to' an employee benefit plan but are not 'saved' because
they do not regulate insurance. 46 "State laws that directly regulate
insurance are 'saved' but do not reach self-funded employee benefit
plans because the plans are not deemed to be insurance companies,
other insurers, or engaged in the business of insurance for purposes
of such state laws.
47
In sum, the preemption clause broadly preempts any state law
regulating employee benefit plans, the savings clause saves power
to regulate insurance for the states, and the deemer clause provides
that no employee benefit plan shall be considered an insurance
company in order to prevent back door attempts at state
regulation.
40. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1994).
41. See Daniel W. Sherrick, ERISA Preemption: An introduction, 64 MICH. B.
J. 1074, 1075 (1985).
42. 498 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1990).
43. See id. at 54.
44. See id. at 55.
45. See id.
46. Id. at 61.
47. FMC Corp., 498 U.S at 61.
48. See Moore, supra note 15, at 492-493.
2000]
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
C. ERISA 's Silence on Subrogation and Common Law to Fill in
the Gaps
When Congress enacted ERISA, it intended for the judiciary
to create a body of law to fill in the gaps of the statute's express
provisions.49 This law-making authority, however, is limited to
carrying out the statutory pattern of ERISA 0 Thus, creating
"federal common law is generally inappropriate when its
application would conflict with the statutory provisions of ERISA,
discourage employers from implementing plans governed by
ERISA, or threaten to override the explicit terms of an established
benefit plan."51
As stated previously, Congress intended that plans and plan
sponsors would only be subject to one uniform set of federal
requirements and not conflicting state requirements. 2 Ironically,
this is hardly the case, specifically in the context of ERISA qualified
health care plan subrogation liens. The federal courts are adopting
different common law rules concerning the issue of who pays for
attorneys' fees, resulting in differing outcomes across the nation. 3
The following sections discuss these differing common law
approaches dealing with the question of whether plan beneficiaries
may reduce subrogation liens to reflect their health care plan's pro
rata share of attorneys' fees.
III. Discussion of Common Law Rules Discussed By the Courts
A. The Make-whole Doctrine
The make-whole doctrine provides that no right of subrogation
against a plan beneficiary exists upon the part of the plan where the
49. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987) (holding that
plaintiff's suit asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an
ERISA-regulated plan is preempted because of clear congressional intent for
ERISA's civil enforcement scheme to be exclusive).
50. See Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 1997) (reasoning
that the plaintiff had not shown that adopting a pro rata reduction for attorney fees
of the subrogation lien was necessary to effectuate ERISA's policies).
51. Singer v. Black & Decker Corp., 964 F.2d 1449, 1452 (4th Cir.
1992)(quoting Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906 F.2d 985, 992-993
(4th Cir 1990)).
52. See Singer, 964 F.2d at 1453.
53. See Blackburn v. Sundstrand, 115 F.3d 493, 495 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying
common fund doctrine); Cagle v. Bruner, 112 F.3d 1510, 1522 (11th Cir. 1997)
(applying make-whole doctrine); Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. v. Waller, 906
F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir. 1990) (applying theory of unjust enrichment).
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plan beneficiary's actual loss exceeds the amount recovered from
both the plan and the wrongdoer, after deducting costs and
expenses." The circuits are split over whether or not to apply the
make-whole doctrine as the default rule where an ERISA plan
contains standard subrogation language, but does not expressly
prohibit the make-whole doctrine. 5 While the Eleventh Circuit has
adopted the make-whole doctrine as a default rule in ERISA
subrogation cases, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have construed
standard subrogation language as unambiguously affording an
ERISA plan priority in a recovery situation. 6 The circuit courts
that have adopted the make-whole doctrine as a default rule,
however, allow it to be expressly overridden in a plan's language
because the doctrine serves only as a gap filler when the parties are
silent. 7
In Cagle v. Bruner, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the make-
whole doctrine as a default rule in ERISA cases.5 Cobbie Bruner,
whose mother was a plan participant by virtue of her employment,
was injured in a car accident caused by a third party. 9 Soon after
the accident, the plan paid a small initial claim to Cobbie's mother,
Nancy Bruner, but refused to pay any additional claims for
Cobbie's medical expenses until Nancy Bruner signed a subrogation
agreement provided by the fund.' An action was brought to
54. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 91.
55. See Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 143, 153 (D.
Mass. 1998) (holding that the silence in the plan with respect to attorney fees
permitted the beneficiary to reduce the plan's recovery by a pro rata share of
reasonable attorney fees).
56. Compare Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1389, 1395 (9th
Cir. 1995) (adopting a federal common law rule stating that in the absence of a
clear contract provision to the contrary, an insured must be made whole before an
insurer can enforce its right to subrogation), and Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1521 (adopting
the make-whole doctrine as the default rule in ERISA cases), with Sunbeam-Oster
Co., Inc. v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting the court's serious
doubt as whether it would approve or adopt the make-whole rule as the default
rule for priority of recovery in subrogation between an ERISA plan and its
participant or beneficiary), and Cutting v. Jerome Food, Inc., 993 F.2d. 1293, 1298-
99 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the make-whole rule is overridden by clear
language in the plan).
57. See Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1521 (citing Cutting, 993 F.2d. at 1297).
58. 112 F.3d at 1521.
59. See id. at 1512-13.
60. See id. at 1513. Nancy Bruner did sign a subrogation agreement provided
by the plan, but she attached an addendum to the agreement stating that the
agreement did not "expand the subrogation rights" of the plan. Id. The plan
rejected the amended agreement and promised to pay benefits if Nancy Bruner
signed an unmodified subrogation agreement. See id. Again, Nancy Bruner
attached an addendum to the agreement and the plan rejected this agreement as
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determine if Nancy Bruner could be required to execute a
subrogation agreement before the plan would process her claims.61
The circuit court held that Nancy Bruner could be required to sign
a subrogation agreement before receiving payment and that the
plan could not participate in any recovery from a third party until
Cobbie was made whole.62 The court adopted the make-whole
doctrine as the standard default rule of interpretation, concluding
that standard subrogation language did not specifically reject the
make-whole doctrine." Cagle's approach parallels the earlier
decision of the Ninth Circuit which held that an ERISA plan
overrides the make-whole doctrine only if it specifically includes
language allowing the plan the right of "first reimbursement out of
any recovery [the beneficiary is] able to obtain, even if the
beneficiary is not made whole." '
In Cutting v. Jerome Food, Inc., the Seventh Circuit rejected a
make-whole qualification to the plan's subrogation rights.65 Mrs.
Cutting was injured in an automobile accident. 6 As a result of the
accident, Mrs. Cutting received $126,000 from her uninsured
motorist policy and another $500,000 from a products liability
claim.67 Mrs. Cutting, however, estimated that her damages from
the accident were $1,000,000.6 Mrs. Cutting's husband's employee
benefits plan agreed to pay for her medical bills provided that the
Cuttings agreed to reimburse it for any amounts received in
recovery against a third party.69 The Cuttings refused to reimburse
the plan, contending that the plan's right to subrogation did not
arise until the covered individual was made whole.0 In affirming the
lower court's grant of summary judgement for the plan, the Seventh
Circuit did not accept or reject the make-whole doctrine; instead,
the court held that the company's interpretation, that the plan
language did not incorporate the make-whole doctrine, was
reasonable. 1 The court reasoned that the rejection of the make-
well. See Cagle, 112 F.3d at 1513.
61. See id. at 1513-14.
62. See id. at 1522.
63. See id. at 1521.
64. Barnes v. Indep. Auto. Dealers Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1995).
65. 993 F.2d. 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1993).
66. See id. at 1294.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See id. at 1294-95. (the medical expenses amounted to $90,000).
70. See Cutting, 993 F.2d at 1295.
71. See id. at 1299. The subrogation clause of Mr. Cutting's benefits plan
provided that by accepting any payment of plan benefits, the covered employee or
dependent "agrees that the Plan shall be subrogated to all claims, demands, actions
368 [Vol. 104:2
ERISA QUALIFIED SUBOGATION LIENS
whole rule in favor of unequivocal subrogation or reimbursement
rights had the effect of reducing "the price of insurance and thus
enables the insured to obtain more coverage, in effect trading an
uncertain bundle of tort rights for a larger certain right .... 72
In Waller v. Hormel Foods Corp., the Eighth Circuit indicated
that the make-whole doctrine should not be applied in ERISA
cases.73 In concluding that it would not apply the make-whole
doctrine, the court contrasted insurances policies with self-funded
health care plans.74 The court noted that " '[t]he very heart of the
bargain when the insured purchases insurance is that if there is a
loss, he or she will be made whole' " and self-funded health care
plans should not be viewed in this fashion.75 The court in Harris v.
Harvard Pilgrim Health Care adopted the same reasoning as Waller
because it felt that the reasoning promoted the policies of ERISA
to make sure that a member is not reimbursed twice for medical
expenses, and that the plan benefits available to other employees
are not depleted.76 Like the courts in Waller and Harris, the Fifth
Circuit also expressed serious doubt that it would ever adopt the
make-whole doctrine as a default rule for the priority of recovery in
ERISA reimbursement or subrogation situations.77
In accordance with courts holding that plans may contract out
of the make-whole doctrine, "ERISA plans have been revised to
close the door on default application of the [make-whole] doctrine"
and the doctrine is no longer an issue." The issue of attorneys' fees,
however, is still being debated. Despite their rejection of the make-
whole doctrine, many courts remain unsatisfied with the unfair
results of having beneficiaries pay for attorneys whose efforts
and rights of recovery of the individual against any third party or insurer ... to the
extent of any and all payments made or to be made hereunder by the Plan." Id. at
1295.
72. Id. at 1298.
73. 120 F.3d 138, 140 (8th Cir. 1997).
74. See id.
75. Id. at 140 (quoting Powell v. Blue Cross v. Blue Shield, 581 So.2d 772, 777
(Ala. 1990)).
76. 20 F. Supp.2d 143, 151 (D. Mass. 1998). The Harris court noted that it
would be a difficult task for a court to determine what dollar amount makes a
plaintiff whole in situations where a plaintiff has intangible losses or is
comparatively negligent. See id.
77. See Sunbeam-Oster Co., Inc. v. Whitehurst, 102 F.3d 1368, 1376-1377 (5th
Cir 1996) (holding the plan's reimbursement provisions were not ambiguous and
gave the plan the right to full reimbursement off the top of the beneficiary's
recoveries from tortfeasor and tortfeasor's insurer).
78. William Wilde, ERISA: Where We Are, How We Got Here, and Where Do
We Go From Here?, 19 THE VERDICT 17, 18 (1996).
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benefit health care plans."9 These courts have gone on to reduce
subrogation liens by the amount of reasonable attorneys' fees.'
B. Reasonable Attorney Fees Rule
Instead of applying the make-whole doctrine, the Waller court
created the reasonable attorney fees rule.81 Under this rule, when
no express reference to attorney fees are made in a subrogation
clause, the Plan's recovery is reduced by the amount of a
reasonable attorney fee.' The court went on to say that a plan's
silence on the issue of attorney fees is not easily construed:8
It may mean that the Plan should always receive 100% of its
claim for reimbursement, even if that produces unfair results in
a particular case, so that the Plan retains maximum control over
efforts to recover from third parties. But it may also mean that
the Plan will pay reasonable fees and expenses so as to
encourage beneficiaries to press claims to which the Plan will be
partially subrogated.8
The Waller court reduced the plan's subrogation lien by the
amount of a reasonable attorney fee and described reasonable
attorney fees to be an amount that the plan would have expended
in pursuit of settlement recovery.8
In Serembus v. Mathwig, the court rejected the make-whole
doctrine, but reduced the plan's subrogation lien by one-third to
cover the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee.86 The court
79. See Waller, 120 F.3d at 141 (reducing the plan's subrogation lien by the
amount of a reasonable attorney fee after rejecting the application of the make-
whole doctrine); Serembus v. Mathwig, 817 F. Supp. 1414, 1422-23 (E.D. Wis.
1992) (refusing to adopt Wisconsin's make-whole doctrine, but still reducing the
plan's subrogation lien by one-third to fairly apportion attorney fees).
80. See Waller, 120 F.3d at 141; Serembus, 817 F. Supp. at 1423.




85. See id. at 142. In Waller, the plan contended that it would have made a
claim against the negligent third party itself (once the extent of medical benefits to
be provided to the beneficiary was better known), but the Wallers jumped the gun
and obtained a settlement with little effort. See Waller, 120 F.3d at 141. In light of
these facts, the court determined that the amount of a reasonable attorney fee
would be the amount that the plan would have expended had it pursued the third
party itself. See id.
86. 817 F. Supp. 1414, 1423 (E.D. Wis. 1992); see also Carpenter v. Modern
Drop Forge Co., 919 F. Supp. 1198, 1206 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (noting that the court in
Serembus grounded its opinion on the inherent and equitable authority of the
court to determine what is fair).
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reasoned that "[h]ad the defendant not engaged an attorney and
pursued her claims in state court, the Fund would not have
recovered any of the benefits paid concerning defendant's injuries.
Since the fund benefits from defend-ant's pursuit of her claims, a
one-third reduction of the Fund's subrogation amount of the
settlement fairly apportions the attorney's fees.""
C. The Common Fund Doctrine
Simply stated, the common fund doctrine provides that an
attorney who performs services in creating a fund in a personal
injury case, should be paid out of the whole fund from those who
benefit from the fund.8 Those who benefit from the fund include
the plan seeking reimbursement from the fund (settlement or
judgment) and beneficiary whose attorney created the fund. Since
both the beneficiary and plan benefit from the fund, both should
have to pay for the attorney who created it. The three
requirements of the common fund doctrine state that:
1) The fund must be created as a result of legal services
performed by an attorney;
2) the subrogee (plan) must not participate in the creation of
the fund; and
3) the subrogee must benefit from the fund.8 9
In Scholtens v. Schneider the court held that the Illinois
common fund doctrine was not preempted by ERISA.90 In
Blackburn v. Sundstrand Corp., the court noted that the Scholtens
ruling created a conflict between state and federal courts in the
same jurisdiction and clarified the confusion by agreeing with the
Scholtens court.9' The Blackburn court stated that the common
fund rule, unlike the anti-subrogation law in FMC Corp. v.
Holliday, was general and its effect on a plan was incidental.'
The common fund doctrine long predates not only ERISA, but
also employer-sponsored health plans. Most applications have
nothing to do with health insurance in general, or employer-
sponsored plans in particular. The doctrine could be thought
87. Serembus, 817 F. Supp. at 1423. (citing Dugan v. Nickla, 763 F. Supp. 981,
984 (N.D. Ill. 1991)).
88. See Robert J. Thompson, The Common Fund Doctrine: An Uncommonly
Used Precept in Personal Injury Cases, 84 ILL. B. J. 570 (1996).
89. Id.
90. 671 N.E.2d 657 (Ill. 1996).
91. 115 F.3d 493,495 (7th Cir. 1997).
92. See id. at 496 (distinguishing the Pennsylvania anti-subrogation law, which
was held to be preempted by ERISA, from the Illinois common fund doctrine).
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'related' to an 'employee benefit plan' only in the trivial sense
that, 'as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything
is related to something else.' 93
In Wal-mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health and Welfare Plan v.
Bond, the court applied the common fund doctrine in requiring the
plan to pay its proportion of the beneficiary's attorney's fee in an
action against a third party.9 ' Mr. Bond was injured in an
automobile accident and his attorney signed and returned a
subrogation acknowledgment to the Wal-Mart plan.95 Attached to
the subrogation acknowledgment was a cover letter stating Bond's
attorney's assumption that the plan would allow for the deduction
of an attorney's fee.99 Seven months later, Wal-mart wrote Bond's
attorney saying that any and all attorney fees were the
responsibility of Mr. Bond.97 After Mr. Bond and his attorney
obtained a settlement, both parties filed motion for summary
judgment on the issue of attorney fees.9' In granting summary
judgement for Mr. Bond, the court stated that "unless clearly
precluded by contract, public policy, or other compelling reason,
Federal common law notions of equity dictate that a party who
benefits from a common fund must share in the expense of creating
it."9
It is difficult to understand why insurers and employee benefit
plans would, in all fairness, avoid the common fund doctrine. '°°
"Without the efforts of the beneficiaries and their attorneys, there
93. Id. at 495 (citing California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832, 843 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring)).
94. No. CIV.A. 96-7522, 1997 WL 255527, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997).
95. See id. at *1.
96. See id.
97. See id. at *2.
98. See id.
99. Bond, 1997 WL 255527, at *2 (noting that the common fund doctrine has
long been the law in Pennsylvania). The subrogation language in the Bond case
reads: "[t]he Plan has the right to ... recover benefits previously paid by the plan
to the extent that medical expenses may be payable..." Id. at *1. The court
distinguished the subrogation language in the Bond case from the subrogation
language in Ryan and Bollman because the term "benefits" is not preceded by a
definite article such as "any" or "all." See id. at *3. In Ryan, the relevant
subrogation language explicitly required 100% reimbursement. See Ryan by
Capria-Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 1996) (rejecting the
application of the common law theory of unjust enrichment to plan language that
unambiguously required full reimbursement). In Bollman, the relevant
subrogation language "any payments" and "all... rights of recovery" was held to
be materially identical to the language in Ryan. See Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112
F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir. 1997).
100. See Murphy, supra note 6, at 92.
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would be no reimbursement. It is very seldom that an insurer or
plan initiates subrogation litigation on its own. When it does, it's a
safe bet that their attorneys are being paid for their efforts."'
01
D. Unjust Enrichment
The general principle of unjust enrichment is that "one person
should not be permitted unjustly to enrich himself at the expense of
another, but should be required to make restitution of or for
property or benefits received ... where it is just and equitable that
such restitution be made... ,,102 In the context of ERISA qualified
health care plan subrogation liens it has been argued that if a plan is
allowed to recover its entire subrogation lien without sharing in the
cost of an attorney, the plan will be unjustly enriched.'
In Ryan by Capria-Ryan v. Federal Express Corp., the Third
Circuit refused to apply the common law theory of unjust
enrichment where the language of a subrogation provision
unambiguously required a beneficiary of a plan to pay back all the
money received by the beneficiary.' ° Mr. Ryan's Federal Express
Group Health Plan required that 100% of benefits paid be
reimbursed to the plan 5 The Ryans' daughter was born with
cerebral palsy and severe brain damage" 6 The Ryans obtained
benefits under the plan and subsequently settled a malpractice
claim. 10 7 The Ryans offered to pay only part of the plan's
subrogation lien, asserting that they should be able to subtract a pro
rata share of a reasonable attorney fee." Both parties moved for
summary judgement and the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Ryans stating that implementation of the
subrogation provision would confer an unjust benefit upon the plan
if they did not have to share the expense of the attorney's fees."°
The Third Circuit rejected the District Court's holding and
interpreted ERISA's silence on subrogation to mean that an
application of the state common law doctrine of unjust enrichment
101. Id.
102. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1068 (6th ed. 1990).
103. See Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health and Welfare Plan, 7 F.
Supp.2d 927, 929 (W.D.Mich. 1998), affd in part, rev'd in part, Nos. 98-1285,
981346, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24831, at *1 (6th Cir. Sep. 30, 1999).
104. 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1996).
105. See id. at 124.
106. See id. at 125.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Ryan,78 F.3d at 125.
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would, in effect, create federal common law establishing substantive
ERISA rights when there was no showing that an adoption of the
doctrine was necessary to effectuate the policies of ERISA." ° The
court further held that "[e]nrichment is not unjust where it is
allowed by the express terms of the.., plan."'
111
The Third Circuit applied its holding in Ryan to a set of nearly
identical facts in Bollman Hat Co. v. Root."2 The main difference
between the two cases lies in the subrogation language provided by
each plan. In Bollman, the court considered the relevant
subrogation language of the plan, including "any payments" and
"all... rights of recovery," to be materially identical to the
subrogation language in Ryan."3
Conversely, in Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. v Waller, the
court applied the federal common law rule of unjust enrichment on
behalf of the plan administrator allowing subrogation." ' In Waller
II, the beneficiary never signed a reimbursement agreement with
the health care plan as a prerequisite to the advancement of
funds."' The funds, however, were advanced nonetheless. 1 6 The
court held that "no one party, not even plan beneficiaries, should
unjustly profit.""' 7
In Ward v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc. Associates Health & Welfare
Plan, the district court reasoned that because the plan was silent on
attorney fees, it could be consistently construed with the federal
common law principle of unjust enrichment."8 Furthermore, the
district court noted that "if the [p]lan were construed to allow full
recovery of the benefits paid without regard to attorney fees, it
could lead to the result that the plaintiff would be liable to the plan
for more than the plaintiff actually recovered.""' 9 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals overruled the district court's holding by stating
that "when a plan is clear and unambiguous, we cannot apply a
common-law rule of interpretation but, instead, must give the plain
110. See id. at 127.
111. Id. (quoting Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Retirement Plan, 797 F.2d
383,390 (7th Cir. 1986)).
112. 112 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1997).
113. Id. at 116-17.
114. 906 F.2d 985, 993 (4th Cir. 1990).
115. See id. at 986.
116. See id.
117. Id. at 993.
118. 7 F. Supp.2d 927, 929 (W.D.Mich. 1998), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Nos.
98-1285, 981346, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24831, at *1 (6th Cir. Sep. 30, 1999).
119. Id.
[Vol. 104:2
ERISA QUALIFIED SUBOGATION LIENS
language of the plan it's natural meaning."'20 The Sixth Circuit
determined that the language of the plan did not limit or restrict its
right to full reimbursement. 2' The Sixth Circuit did, however, add a
caveat to their holding concerning attorney fees. 12 2 "[I]n keeping
with the language of the Plan," the Sixth Circuit concluded that the
"payment resulting from a judgment" consisted of a payment that
went two-thirds to the Wards and one-third to the attorneys, such
that the Plan may recover only two-thirds of the payment from the
Wards. 123 The Court then suggested that the Plan file suit against
the attorney to recover the remaining one-third of the amount it is
due.'24 This ruling further complicates the issue of attorney fees in
the context of ERISA qualified subrogation liens and discourages
attorneys from getting involved in these types of cases for fear of
being sued themselves.
IV. Conclusion
Courts are troubled by the harsh standard set against
beneficiaries who are trying to reduce subrogation liens to reflect a
plan's pro rata share of attorney fees. In IBP, Inc. v. Foust the
court noted the following: "we would not hesitate ... to use either
the doctrine of unjust enrichment or the federal common fund
doctrine to require [a plan] to bear its fair share of the
[beneficiary's] attorneys' fees. It seems the only just result.
However, the court is faced with binding contrary authority... and
a body of law that does not permit such a result.'
' 2
1
Similarly in Silcott v. Wal-mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health and
Welfare Plan the court felt that it was unfair to make the
beneficiary pay the entire attorney's fee, but the court was bound
by Ryan and Bollman.'26 The court noted that beneficiaries may not
want to retain attorneys if their own recovery will be taxed by doing
SO.' Also, the court stated that an ERISA plan document is not
120. Ward v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Assoc. Health and Welfare Plan, Nos. 98-
1285, 981346, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24831, at *1, *12 (6th Cir. Sep. 30, 1999).
121. See id.
122. See id. at *13.
123. Id.
124. See id.
125. 987 F. Supp. 714, 722 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (holding that federal common law
could not be used to negate the plan's unambiguous full reimbursement language).
126. No. CIV. A. 97-7044, 1998 WL 422032, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 1998)
(holding that the language of the defendant plan is unambiguous under the Third




comparable to a collective bargaining agreement.28  Plan
beneficiaries have no bargaining power whatsoever and plan
providers have "sole control of the terms of the plan whether fair or
unfair.""9
Even the Third Circuit is troubled by the prospect that the
holding in Ryan could hinder the settlement of claims by plan
beneficiaries against third parties." The Third Circuit should be
troubled by this prospect because no one could blame a plan
participant for not pursuing a negligent third party where case law
makes it very possible that the plan participant would be forced to
pay for a lawyer with out-of-pocket funds.
Considering that the federal courts have applied or rejected
several differing theories in resolving disputes between
beneficiaries and plans over attorneys' fees and subrogation, it is
safe to assume that federal courts are confused about how to deal
with ERISA health care plan subrogation issues. If the courts are
not confused, the attorneys probably are. A uniform federal
common law rule is required to clear up the confusion.
Even courts that have clear precedent before them are
troubled by the unfair results in applying that precedent. 3' The
courts recognize that requiring beneficiaries to pay for attorneys'
fees may hinder beneficiaries from pursuing third party claims at
all, especially in situation where a beneficiary could be paying for
an attorney's fee out of his own pocket."2 As the law stands now,
however, a company or corporation that drafts subrogation
language that clearly states the plan's entitlement to 100% reim-
bursement will not be required to pay a pro rata share of attorneys'
fees when a beneficiary pursues a third party.'33 Courts that
reduced subrogation liens to reflect a pro rata share of attorneys'
fees did so with plans that had ambiguous subrogation language or
no subrogation language at all.'34
128. See id. at *6.
129. Id.
130. See Bollman Hat Co. v. Root, 112 F.3d 113, 117 (3d. Cir. 1997).
131. See Silcott, 1998 WL 422032, at *5; IBP, Inc. v. Foust, 987 F. Supp. 714, 721
(N.D. Iowa 1997).
132. See Bollman 112 F.3d at 117.
133. See id. at 118; Ryan by Capria Ryan v. Federal Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123,
127 (3d Cir. 1996); IBP, Inc. v. Foust, 987 F. Supp. 714, 722 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
134. See Harris v. Harvard Pilgrim Health Care, Inc., 20 F. Supp.2d 143 (D.
Mass. 1998) (construing the silence in the plan to permit the beneficiary to reduce
the subrogation lien by the plan's pro rata share of attorney fees); Ward v. Wal-
Mart Stores Assoc. Health and Welfare Plan,-7 F. Supp.2d 927, 929 (W.D. Mich.
1998) (requiring the plan to absorb its pro rata share of attorney fees because the
plan was silent on the issue); Wal-mart Stores, Inc. Associates Health and Welfare
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Eventually plan drafters will uniformly draft health care plans
with unambiguous subrogation language. The only way to ensure
that plans pay their share of attorneys' fees, when their
beneficiaries pursue third parties, is for the federal courts to
uniformly adopt a reasonable attorney fees rule, even in cases
where plan subrogation language is unambiguous. Forgetting the
common fund doctrine, the make-whole doctrine, and the unjust
enrichment argument in the context of ERISA plan subrogation
litigation, courts should simply apply a reasonable attorney fees
rule in all cases. In cases where ERISA plans are subrogated to a
beneficiary's recovery from third parties, plans will always be
required to pay a pro rata share of attorney fees. If the courts are
reluctant to adopt this rule, relief to allow attorney fees to be
deducted from subrogation liens must come from Congress.135
Amber M. Anstine
Plan v. Bond, No. CIV. A. 96-7522, 1997 WL 255527, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997)
(holding the ambiguous language of the plan to allow for a reduction in the plan's
subrogation lien to reflect a pro rata share of attorney's fees).
135. See Silcott, 1998 WL 422032, at *6.
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